

Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2021 on the ECJ Decision of 25 February 2021 in *Société Générale* (Case C-403/19) on the Calculation of the Maximum Amount of a Foreign Direct Tax Credit

In this CFE Opinion Statement, submitted to the EU Institutions in September 2021, the CFE ECJ Task Force comments on the ECJ decision in *Société Générale* (Case C-403/19), which reinforces established case law that EU law neither prohibits juridical double taxation nor does it put an obligation on the residence Member State to prevent the disadvantages that could arise from the exercise of competence thus attributed by the two Member States.

1. Introduction

This is an Opinion Statement prepared by the CFE ECJ Task Force on the *Société Générale* case, in respect of which the Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) delivered its decision on 25 February 2020 in the absence of an Advocate General's Opinion. In *Société Générale*, the Court confirmed previous case law, holding that the French method of calculating the maximum amount of foreign direct tax credits for cross-border dividends to offset the double taxation of dividends received by a company subject to French corporate income tax is not contrary to the free movement of capital under article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2007).¹ The higher tax burden on foreign dividends resulting from the difference in tax bases – net taxation and corresponding credit limitation in France, gross withholding taxation in the source states – is therefore not prohibited under the fundamental freedoms.

2. Background and Issues

Juridical double taxation of cross-border dividends is typically addressed by the ordinary credit method along the lines of articles 23A(2) and 23B(1) of the OECD Model (2017):² a withholding tax lawfully levied in accordance with article 10(2) of the OECD Model by the source state on dividends will be deducted (i.e. a "credit" granted) from the tax on that income in the residence state. That deduction, however, "is restricted to that part of its own tax which is appropriate to the income which may be taxed in the other State"³ ("maximum deduction" or "credit limitation"). From a policy perspective, this limitation of the credit prevents the full use of source state taxes to offset tax on domestic or third-country income. As the Commentary on the OECD Model (2017)⁴ notes, "[t]he maximum deduction is normally computed as the tax on net income", i.e. on the income from the source state, "less allowable deductions (specified or proportional) connected with such income". The potentially disadvantageous effects of this ordinary credit method are obvious. The maximum deduction may be lower than the tax effectively paid in the source state, for example, when the source state levies a tax on gross income (for example, 15% on the gross amount of the dividends under article 10(2)(b) of the OECD Model), while the residence state determines the foreign-sourced dividend income on a net basis after the deduction of expenses. In other words, the lower the net income in the source state (from the residence state's perspective), the lower the maximum deduction. This may lead to situations in which the amount of net income subject to tax in the residence state and, as a corollary, the maximum deduction "may be very small, or there may even be no net income at all".⁵ Hence, where the foreign tax exceeds the maximum deduction, part of the foreign tax burden remains unrelieved; the higher foreign tax hence prevails. The Commentary on the OECD Model does not directly

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1. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007, OJ C115 (2008), Primary Sources IBFD.

2. *OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital* (21 Nov. 2017), Treaties & Models IBFD [hereinafter *OECD Model* (2017)].
 3. For numerical examples, see *OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 23 para. 23* (21 Nov. 2017), Treaties & Models IBFD [hereinafter *OECD Model: Commentary* (2017)].
 4. Paras. 40 and 63 *OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23* (2017).
 5. Para. 63 *OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23* (2017) (concerning interest income).

address this issue of “excess credits”, but rather refers to bilateral negotiations or domestic laws.⁶ While some states have indeed enacted rules on, for example, the carry-forward of excess credits⁷ or (at least) the deduction of excess foreign taxes from the tax base,⁸ such measures have, so far, neither been viewed as being required by the OECD Model⁹ nor by domestic constitutional law.¹⁰ This is notwithstanding the fact that the refusal of a carry-forward or other form of relief may lead to intertemporal double taxation.

From the perspective of the EU fundamental freedoms, the 2011 decision in *Haribo and Salinen* (Case C-436/08)¹¹ has already addressed the situation of a disallowance of a credit, i.e., where the recipient of a foreign dividend was in an overall loss situation. In that case, the Court held that a credit carry-forward is not required by the free movement of capital under article 63 of the TFEU. In light of more recent cases, such as *Beker and Beker* (Case C-168/11)¹² and *Miljoen and Others* (Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14),¹³ however, *Société Générale* again brought the issue of double taxation and the “maximum deduction” before the Court. Indeed, in *Société Générale*, the “maximum deduction” foreseen in the French tax treaties with Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands exposed cross-border dividends to a higher overall tax burden than domestic dividends would bear. This was because the various source states (Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) imposed a withholding tax on the gross amount of the dividends, while the tax on those

dividends and the corresponding “maximum deduction” in France was calculated on a net base (i.e. after the deduction of charges). The issue is obvious (and common under all OECD patterned treaties): Is the resulting higher tax burden on foreign-source dividends as compared with domestic source dividends an infringement on the free movement of capital under article 63 of the TFEU?

3. Facts

The facts of the *Société Générale* case are rather straightforward. SGAM Banque, a French company, received dividends in connection with securities lending and fund structuring transactions from companies established in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Each of the source states levied a dividend withholding tax on a gross basis, whilst France, as the state of residence, taxed the dividends under French corporate income tax on a net basis, i.e. after the deduction of certain charges.¹⁴ Under the applicable French tax treaties with Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and French domestic law, in order to offset double taxation, SGAM Banque was entitled to a foreign tax credit. Following an audit by the French tax authorities, however, the credits for the tax years ending in 2004 and 2005 were limited to the “maximum deduction”, i.e. to the French corporate income tax corresponding to those dividends after the deduction of related charges (i.e. net basis taxation). *Société Générale* SA, a French company, in its capacity as parent company of the tax-integrated group that includes SGAM Banque, challenged these assessments. According to *Société Générale* SA, this method for calculating the foreign tax credit placed cross-border dividends at a disadvantage compared to domestic dividends, as it did not allow for a credit that fully eliminated the double taxation on the dividends. The disadvantage resulted from the fact that, under the French legislation, the net income for the calculation of the tax credit was a result of the deduction of charges against the gross amount of the dividends and, accordingly, SGAM Banque could not completely offset the foreign, gross-based withholding taxes levied in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. *Société Générale* SA argued that the French legislation violated the freedom of capital movement under article 63 of the TFEU.

As is evident from the request for a preliminary ruling and the Court’s description of the dispute,¹⁵ the referring French *Conseil d’État* was well aware of the Court’s case law that, first, juridical double taxation in the European Union was not seen as contrary to the fundamental freedoms and, second, that EU law does not require a Member State to grant a concession to offset the disadvantage resulting from a series of charges to tax that results from the parallel exercise of the various Member States’ fiscal sovereignty (*Kerckhaert and Morres* (Case C-513/04)¹⁶

6. Para. 66 *OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23* (2017).
7. See, for example, for the United States US: IRC, para. 904(c) (carry-forward of 10 years and carry-back of one year) and, for Canada, CA: Income Tax Act, para. 126(2)(a) (for business income carry-forward of 10 years and carry-back of three years).
8. See, for example, for Germany, DE: Income Tax Act (EStG), para. 34c(2) and (6) 2nd sentence.
9. See, for example, AT: Supreme Administrative Court (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*, VwGH), 20 Apr. 1999, 99/14/0012, ÖStZB, p. 696 (1999); IN: Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Mumbai), 10 Mar. 2004, *Joint Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Digital Equipments India Ltd.*, 2005 94 ITD 340 Mum, 2005 277 ITR 15 Mum, (2005) 93 TTJ Mum 478; AT: VwGH, 28 Sept. 2004, 2000/14/0172, ÖStZB, p. 219 (2005); BE: Constitutional Court, 29 Jan. 2014, Case 5547; AT: VwGH, 27 Nov. 2014, 2012/15/0002. The historical documents are inconclusive but the issue of cross-period crediting was briefly touched upon during the work on the 1963 OECD Draft Model (*OECD Draft Tax Convention on Income and on Capital* (30 July 1963)), but was eventually left open: Working Party 15 raised the question “whether the deduction should be restricted to the fiscal year in which the income is included for tax purposes, or whether, for practical reasons, the deduction might be given for any fiscal year in which the claim for relief may be made (‘subsequent credit’)” (see FC/WP15(59) [2 Mar. 1959] Part I, 14).
10. See, for example, BE: Constitutional Court, 29 Jan. 2014, no. 14/2014, Case 5547, Case Law IBFD.
11. AT: ECJ, 10 Feb. 2011, Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08, *Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel BetriebsgmbH and Österreichische Salinen AG v. Finanzamt Linz*, paras. 166-172, Case Law IBFD.
12. DE: ECJ, 28 Feb. 2013, Case C-168/11, *Manfred Beker and Christa Beker v. Finanzamt Heilbronn*, EU:C:2013:117, Case Law IBFD; see also the subsequent domestic decision in this case by the German *Bundesfinanzhof* (BFH), DE: BFH: 18 Dec. 2013, I R 71/10, IStR p. 302 (2014).
13. NL: ECJ, 17 Sept. 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14, *Miljoen, X, Société Générale SA v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën*, EU:C:2015:608. See also, on that case, the discussion of the CFE ECJ Task Force: CFE ECJ Task Force, *Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 1/2016 on the Decision of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases Miljoen (Case C-10/14), X (Case C-14/14) and Société Générale (Case C-17/14) on the Netherlands Dividend Withholding Tax*, 56 Eur. Taxn. 6 (2016), Journal Articles & Opinion Pieces IBFD.

14. In this case, manufactured dividends, i.e. after the deduction of charges that fully offset the amount of the dividends received under securities lending and funds structuring transactions.
15. See *Société Générale* (C-403/19), paras. 19-22.
16. BE: ECJ, 14 Nov. 2006, Case C-513/04, *Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v. Belgische Staat*, EU:C:2006:713, Case Law IBFD.

and *Haribo and Salinen* (Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08).¹⁷ It was also noted by the referring court, however, that when applying a tax treaty, a Member State must comply with EU law (*De Groot* (Case C-385/00),¹⁸ *Beker and Beker* (Case C-168/11)¹⁹ and *Jacob and Lennertz* (Case C-174/18)).²⁰ More specifically, if a Member State has decided to grant a concession, that power must be exercised in accordance with EU law (*Orange European Smallcap Fund* (Case C-194/06)²¹ and *Sauvage and Lejeune* (Case C-602/17)²²). The *Conseil d'État* was, therefore, “unsure as to the margin of discretion left to Member States when adopting a mechanism for the elimination of double taxation”²³ and referred the following question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:

In the light of Article [63 TFEU], does the fact that the application of the rules set out in paragraph 5 of that decision, in order to compensate for the double taxation of dividends paid to a company liable for corporation tax in the Member State of residence by a company resident in another Member State and subject, by virtue of the exercise by that Member State of the power of taxation, to withholding tax is liable to create a disadvantage to the detriment of transactions involving the securities of foreign companies carried out by companies liable for corporation tax in the first Member State mean that that State, where it has been decided to grant a concession in response to the double taxation, goes beyond waiving its right to receive the tax revenue that it would derive from the imposition of corporation tax on the dividends in question?

4. The Decision of the Court of Justice

In *Société Générale*, the Court had to answer the question of whether a mere ordinary credit under a tax treaty, “limited to the amount which the first Member State would receive if those dividends alone were subject to corporation tax” and as such whether the refusal to “[offset] in full the levy paid in that other Member State”²⁴ violated the free movement of capital under article 63 of the TFEU.

The Court first reiterated three established lines of case law:

- (i) As a starting point, each Member State is “free to organize, in compliance with EU law, its system for taxing distributed profits and to define, in that context, the tax base and the tax rate which apply to the shareholder receiving them”.²⁵
- (ii) While this may lead to juridical double taxation of cross-border dividends, this is neither discrimina-

tory *per se*²⁶ nor does EU law, as it currently stands, impose an obligation on the residence Member State to prevent the disadvantages that could arise from the exercise of competence thus attributed by the two Member States.²⁷

- (iii) In addition, while Member States are free to determine the connecting factors for the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction in tax treaties, in exercising “the power of taxation, so allocated by bilateral conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, the Member States must comply with EU rules and, more particularly, observe the principle of equal treatment”.²⁸

Regarding the double taxation of the dividends distributed to SGAM Banque by companies established in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the Court highlighted that regarding “the exercise by France of its powers of taxation” (i) all resident companies are subject to corporation tax on dividends received, regardless of whether such dividends are from domestic or foreign sources; (ii) such income is part of the total income of the company concerned, from which operating costs are deducted, without any reference to differential tax rates; and (iii) the same rules for allocating costs that derive from the French General Tax Code would apply to that income, regardless of its origin.²⁹

As for the tax credit and the method of calculating it (the credit being limited to the tax paid in the source Member State, which could not exceed the French corporation tax corresponding to that income), the Court noted that “the basis of assessment and the rate of corporation tax corresponding to that income alone appear to be the same as that of the corporation tax which would be due if the dividends were domestic-source dividends. In particular, the charges relating specifically to dividends deducted in making that calculation … also appear to be deducted from the overall profits of the resident company in respect of domestic-source dividends”.³⁰ Subject to verification by the national court, therefore, the Court concluded that “it does not appear that dividends distributed by companies established in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are subject to a higher rate of corporation tax in France than that applied to domestic-source dividends”.³¹

Having clarified that France did not discriminate in setting its tax base, the Court had to address the issue of juridical double taxation. Indeed, *Société Générale* SA had argued that the tax credit calculated under the “maximum deduction” was insufficient, as it resulted in a higher tax

17. *Haribo and Salinen* (C-436/08 and C-437/08).

18. NL: ECJ, 12 Dec. 2002, Case C-385/00, *F. W. L. de Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën*, EU:C:2002:750, Case Law IBFD.

19. *Manfred Beker and Christa Beker* (C-168/11); see also the subsequent domestic decision in this case, IR 71/10 (18 Dec. 2013).

20. BE: ECJ, 14 Mar. 2019, Case C-174/18, *Jean Jacob and Dominique Lennertz v. État belge*, EU:C:2019:205, Case Law IBFD.

21. NL: ECJ, 20 May 2008, Case C-194/06, *Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange European Smallcap Fund NV*, EU:C:2008:289, Case Law IBFD.

22. BE: ECJ, 24 Oct. 2018, Case C-602/17, *Benoit Sauvage, Kristel Lejeune v. État belge*, EU:C:2018:856, Case Law IBFD.

23. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 23.

24. Id., para. 25.

25. Id., para. 26, referring to *Orange European Smallcap Fund NV* (C-194/06), para. 30 and ECJ, 4 Feb. 2016, Case C-194/15, *Baudinet and Others*, EU:C:2016:81, para. 30.

26. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 27, referring to *Haribo and Salinen* (C-436/08 and C-437/08), para. 169 and IT: ECJ, 4 Feb. 2016, Case C-194/15, *Véronique Baudinet and Others v. Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Provinciale I di Torino*, EU:C:2016:81, para. 32, Case Law IBFD.

27. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 29, referring to *Haribo and Salinen* (C-436/08 and C-437/08), para. 170 and *Baudinet and Others* (C-194/15), para. 33.

28. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 30, referring to *Sauvage and Lejeune* (C-602/17), para. 24 and *Jean Jacob and Dominique Lennertz* (C-174/18), para. 25.

29. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 32.

30. Id., para. 34.

31. Id., para. 35.

burden on foreign-sourced dividends than on domestic dividends. This put transactions involving securities of non-resident companies at a disadvantage compared to those involving securities of resident companies.³² The reason for that disadvantage was the “difference between the tax base applied by the Member State in which the dividends are paid and that of French corporation tax, which determines the maximum amount of the tax credit that can be deducted”. It was clear that the tax paid in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had been calculated on the gross amount of those dividends, without the possibility of deduction of charges, whereas French corporation tax was calculated on a net basis (with France allowing the deduction of charges in accordance with domestic law, so that the net income for the calculation of the tax credit was reduced by that deduction of charges).³³

The Court rejected *Société Générale*’s arguments on three grounds. First, the difference in tax bases used by the source Member States (gross amount of the dividends) and by France as the residence Member State (net amount of dividends after deductions) was not contrary to the free movement of capital, as “each Member State is free to define, in compliance with Union law, the tax base which applies to shareholders receiving the dividends”.³⁴ Second, the purpose of a tax treaty “is not to ensure that the taxation to which the taxpayer is subject in one Member State is not higher than that to which he would be subject in the other Member State”.³⁵ Third, “in the absence of discriminatory exercise by a Member State of its tax jurisdiction, a disadvantage resulting from the double taxation of foreign-source dividends, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, arises from the parallel exercise of tax jurisdiction by the States of the source of those dividends and by the Member State of residence of the shareholder company”.³⁶

Finally, the Court had to distinguish *Société Générale* from *Beker and Beker* (Case C-168/11)³⁷ and *Miljoen and Others* (Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14).³⁸ It did so by noting that the latter case concerned the taxation of a non-resident taxpayer’s income by the source Member State and not the taxation of foreign-sourced dividends by the residence State.³⁹ Indeed, *Miljoen and Others* “dealt with the obligations of the Member State in which the dividends were paid, in view of the mechanism for deduction or refund of withholding tax applicable to dividends distributed by resident companies to residents of that Member State”. Conversely, *Beker and Beker* concerned a relief mechanism under which the resident individual taxpayer benefited in full from personal and family deductions when all his income was received in his Member State of residence, whereas that was not the

case when part of his income was received abroad. As the Court noted, however, with a view to *Beker and Beker*, and “subject to verification by the referring court”, in *Société Générale* “the deduction of costs is not limited in the case of dividends distributed by another Member State”.⁴⁰

Having neither found a discriminatory restriction in respect of the French calculation of the tax base and the foreign tax credit nor a violation of the free movement of capital based on unrelieved juridical double taxation, the Court concluded:⁴¹

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 63 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which, in the context of a scheme designed to offset the double taxation of dividends received by a company subject to corporation tax in the Member State in which it is established, which has been subject to a levy by another Member State, grants such a company a tax credit limited to the amount which the first Member State would receive if those dividends alone were subject to corporation tax, without offsetting in full the levy paid in that other Member State.

5. Comments

5.1. Introduction

The limitation of a foreign tax credit based on the typical “maximum deduction” rule in tax treaties (and articles 23A(2) and 23B(1) of the OECD Model) is aimed at preventing source state taxes from offsetting tax on domestic or third-country income. Indeed, if the source state had a higher tax rate than the residence state (on the same tax base), a “full” credit in the residence state would not only eliminate double taxation, but would also reduce the tax burden and corresponding revenue on other (domestic or third-country) income of the taxpayer. The same is true if additional differences arise regarding the tax base in both countries, such as in *Société Générale* and, more generally, in all situations in which the source state taxes on a gross basis while the residence state does so on a net basis (for example, under articles 10 and 11 of the OECD Model (2017)). Conversely, if the residence state’s tax rate was higher, it would effectively collect an additional tax on lower-taxed source state income. Both results are intended: from a tax treaty perspective it is enough “if the lower of the two taxes were given up”, as it is not the “function of a convention to provide relief in one State from the effects of a higher level of taxation in the other”.⁴² As such, one could view the credit method under article 23 of the OECD Model as merely putting an overall cap on the tax borne by cross-border activities at the higher of either the source or residence state tax. This also becomes clear in a comparison with the exemption method: only in profit situations and where the source state’s tax is at least as high as the residence state’s tax will the ordinary credit and exemption (with progression, in respect of a domestic progressive system of rates) produce the same results.⁴³ From an EU law perspective, however, both the ordinary credit and exemption (also with progression)

32. Id., para. 36.

33. Id., para. 37.

34. Id., para. 38.

35. Id., para. 39, referring to FR: ECJ, 12 May 1998, Case C-336/96, *Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v. Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin*, EU:C:1998:221, para. 46, Case Law IBFD.

36. Id., para. 40.

37. *Manfred Beker and Christa Beker* (C-168/11).

38. *Miljoen and Others* (C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14).

39. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 41.

40. Id., para. 42.

41. Id., para. 43.

42. See FC/WP15(59) (2 Mar. 1959) Part I, p. 12.

43. See also para. 27 OECD Model: *Commentary on Article 23* (2017).

methods are permissible to avoid double taxation.⁴⁴ As regards the “maximum deduction” under the French rules, this has now been explicitly confirmed by the Court in *Société Générale*. If one considers the policy considerations underlying the OECD Model (2017) and the avoidance of juridical double taxation through the “ordinary” credit method, the “maximum deduction” rule at issue in *Société Générale* was fully in line with tax treaty law (and also the Court’s cases on the fundamental freedoms).

5.2. Irrelevance of parallel taxing jurisdiction and disadvantages created by double taxation

The Court in *Société Générale* clearly acknowledged “a disadvantage resulting from the double taxation of foreign-source dividends”, but denied a violation of the fundamental freedoms, as this disadvantage “arises from the parallel exercise of tax jurisdiction by the States of the source of those dividends and by the Member State of residence of the shareholder company”.⁴⁵ As such, *Société Générale* is a good reminder of the fact that the fundamental freedoms, as interpreted by the Court in cases such as *Kerckhaert and Morres*,⁴⁶ do not prohibit juridical double taxation – effectively, the mere parallel exercise of taxing jurisdiction. The impact of this lack of prohibition should not, however, be overestimated. Many issues in the daily life of international taxation are thoroughly resolved by existing tools. For example, as of August 2021, out of the 351 possible bilateral income tax treaty relationships between the 27 Member States, only five are currently not covered by a tax treaty.⁴⁷ (The number of bilateral treaties on inheritance and gift taxes, which are not levied by all Member States, is much smaller).⁴⁸ Of course, disputes can and do still arise with regard to the interpretation of these tax treaties. To resolve such issues, the European Union has chosen a procedural path: Binding arbitration is foreseen both in the EU Arbitration Convention (90/436) for transfer pricing disputes⁴⁹ and the EU Tax Dispute Resolution Directive (2017/1852) [hereinaf-

ter TDRD].⁵⁰ The TDRD provides a binding procedural mechanism for resolving disputes between Member States regarding EU resident taxpayers when those disputes arise from the interpretation and application of agreements and conventions (i.e. tax treaties between Member States and the EU Arbitration Convention (90/436)) that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income and, where applicable, capital, which is especially important for “disputes leading to double taxation”.⁵¹ By virtue of the primacy of EU law, the TDRD is not impacted by any restriction on dispute resolution contained in a tax treaty. Moreover, and even if some technicalities of the TDRD need to be worked out in practice, the mere existence of a legally enforceable, tightly timed arbitration mechanism will certainly have a positive impact on the Member States’ willingness to speedily resolve disputes in mutual agreement proceedings before cases are taken out of their hands and into independent arbitration.

It is nevertheless important to briefly review (and criticize) the Court’s position on juridical double taxation within the framework of the fundamental freedoms. While double taxation “is the most serious obstacle there can be to people and their capital crossing internal borders”,⁵² outside the limited scope of the company tax directives,⁵³ EU law currently neither provides for explicit substantive mechanisms to avoid juridical double taxation of income or capital between Member States,⁵⁴ nor has the Court so far found that the fundamental freedoms offer relief. Indeed, juridical double taxation cannot easily be categorized within the traditional framework of the fundamental freedoms. Since juridical double taxation would prevail even if all Member States (hypothetically) had the same tax system (each with source-based and residence-based taxation demonstrating that the disadvan-

44. See, for example, *Gilly* (C-336/96) and *De Groot* (C-385/00). Equally, the ECJ has found that a participation exemption and an indirect credit (imputation) are, in principle, equally permissible methods to avoid economic double taxation (see *Haribo and Salinen* (C-436/08 and C-437/08), para. 86 et seq. and UK: ECJ, 13 Nov. 2012, Case C-35/11, *Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Commissioners for her Majesty's Revenue & Customs*, EU:C:2012:707, Case Law IBFD).

45. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 40.

46. *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04).

47. The missing relationships are between Cyprus and Croatia (the 1985 treaty was terminated), Cyprus and the Netherlands (a treaty was initialled in 2019 but is not yet in force), Denmark and France (the 1957 treaty was terminated effective 1 Jan. 2009, and a new treaty is currently under negotiation), Denmark and Spain (the 1972 treaty was terminated effective 1 Jan. 2009) and Finland and Portugal (the 1970 treaty was terminated effective 1 Jan. 2019 and the 2016 treaty is not yet in force). However, Sweden has terminated its treaties with Greece and Portugal with effect from 2022 (as for Greece, see SE: Law No. 2021-573. As for Portugal, see PT: Law No. 2021-574).

48. See also the Commission’s Recommendation of 15 December 2011 regarding relief for double taxation of inheritances, OJ L 336/81 (2011).

49. Convention 90/436/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, OJ L 225 (1990), Primary Sources IBFD. See also the Revised Code of Conduct for the Effective Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, OJ C 322/1 (2009).

50. Council Directive 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the European Union, OJ L 265/1 (2017), Primary Sources IBFD.

51. See Pt. 1 of the Preamble to the Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Directive (2017/1852).

52. NL: Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, 26 Oct. 2004, Case C-376/03, *D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen*, EU:C:2004:663, para. 85.

53. Such as the avoidance of juridical double taxation of inter-company dividends under Council Directive 2011/96/EU on the Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, OJ L 345/8 (2011), Primary Sources IBFD and of inter-company interest and royalty payments under Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between Companies of Different Member States, OJ L 157 (2003), Primary Sources IBFD. Also, the step-up provided in art. 5(5) of Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying down Rules against Tax Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, OJ L 193/1 (2016), Primary Sources IBFD [hereinafter ATAD] is a measure to avoid – time delayed – double taxation of the same capital gain, as are the provisions of art. 8(5) and (6) ATAD with regard to CFC rules.

54. The only provision directly dealing with double taxation was former art. 293(2) of the EC Treaty (Maastricht Consolidated version (ex-article 220 EEC Treaty)), which urged the Member States, “so far as is necessary, [to] enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the abolition of double taxation within the Community”. That provision was not directly applicable to the benefit of taxpayers (*Gilly* (C-336/96), para. 15) and was also subject to intense debate with regard to its interpretation. Art. 293 EC Treaty was, however, repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon (Point 280, OJ C 306/1 (2007)) and speculation as to the reasons for its repeal and its effect are ongoing.

tage is created solely by the interaction of the two taxing states and not by discriminatory taxation of either state),⁵⁵ it cannot be (clearly) qualified as a discriminatory restriction or as a mere disparity. While, however, the European Commission⁵⁶ had historically taken the view that double taxation should be prohibited by the fundamental freedoms, the Court's Grand Chamber in its 2006 decision in *Kerckhaert and Morres*⁵⁷ did not share this view.

Kerckhaert and Morres raised the simple question of whether the residence state of a dividend recipient (Belgium) may tax both domestic and cross-border dividends, at the same rate, while allowing, in respect of a cross-border dividend, only a deduction of the foreign (French) withholding tax rather than granting a credit.⁵⁸ Largely following the Advocate General's Opinion,⁵⁹ the Court rejected the notion that the similar treatment of all dividends by Belgium was discriminatory, as the situation of shareholders whose dividends had already been taxed was dissimilar to those whose dividends had not been taxed.⁶⁰ The Court moreover acknowledged that the disadvantage at issue in *Kerckhaert and Morres* resulted from the parallel exercise of fiscal sovereignty by two Member States. The Court noted the importance of tax treaties to eliminate or mitigate the negative effects on the functioning of the Internal Market resulting from the co-existence of national tax systems, but then moved on to state that "Community law, in its current state and in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Community".⁶¹ Hence, "it is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to prevent situations such as that at issue in the main proceedings by applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria followed in international tax practice".⁶²

The Court subsequently confirmed this approach in, for example, *Block* (Case C-67/08),⁶³ *Damseaux* (Case C-128/08),⁶⁴ *Orange European Smallcap Fund*,⁶⁵ *CIBA* (Case C-96/08),⁶⁶ *Haribo and Salinen*,⁶⁷ *Levy & Sebbag* (Case C-540/11),⁶⁸ *Baudinet and Others* (Case C-194/15)⁶⁹ and now in *Société Générale*.⁷⁰ Also, the EFTA Court in *Seabrokers*⁷¹ followed this position in interpreting the freedom of establishment in the EEA Agreement (1992).⁷² While, in those cases, the Court appreciated that there is a "fiscal disadvantage" resulting from juridical double taxation, it also consistently noted that this disadvantage "is the result of the exercise in parallel by the two Member States concerned of their fiscal sovereignty".⁷³ However, "disadvantages which could arise from the parallel exercise of tax competences by different Member States, to the extent that such an exercise is not discriminatory, do not constitute restrictions prohibited by the EC Treaty".⁷⁴ Also, the Court made it quite clear that it would not even be able to decide which Member State would have to refrain from taxation, as EU law does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Union,⁷⁵ emphasizing that there is no natural priority for one of the Member States to tax.⁷⁶ Even though the Court reminds the Member States of the (political) necessity "to take the measures necessary to prevent situations of double taxation by applying, in particular, the criteria followed in international tax practice",⁷⁷ it is clear that juridical double taxation, as such, cannot be challenged under the fundamental freedoms.⁷⁸

The Court consistently finds that Union law does not question the parallel existence of tax competence of the

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55. UK: Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, 23 Feb. 2006, Case C-374/04, *Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, EU:C:2006:139, para. 48, Case Law IBFD.

56. See the Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-2287/99 by Karin Riis-Jørgensen (ELDR) concerning "Right to freedom of movement and Danish tax rules", OJ C 225 E/87 (2000), and the Position taken by the Commission concerning Petition 626/2000 by Mr Klaus Schuler (German), concerning the dual taxation of an inheritance p. 4 (25 Jan. 2007).

57. *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04).

58. Clearly, if no credit is available, the after-tax result for the taxpayer will be better in respect of a purely domestic distribution, while in a cross-border setting, double taxation would occur, reducing the net dividend in comparison to a purely internal situation.

59. BE: Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, 6 Apr. 2006, Case C-513/04, *Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v. Belgische Staat*, EU:C:2006:242, Case Law IBFD.

60. The Court accepted that, in principle, the application of the same rule to different circumstances could amount to a prohibited discrimination, but then stated that "in respect of the tax legislation of his State of residence, the position of a shareholder receiving dividends is not necessarily altered, in terms of that case-law, merely by the fact that he receives those dividends from a company established in another Member State, which, in exercising its fiscal sovereignty, makes those dividends subject to a deduction at source by way of income tax". See *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04), para. 19.

61. Id., para. 22.

62. Id., para. 23.

63. DE: ECJ, 12 Feb. 2009, Case C-67/08, *Margarete Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbeuren*, EU:C:2009:92, para. 28 et seq., Case Law IBFD.

64. BE: ECJ, 16 July 2009, Case C-128/08, *Jacques Damseaux v. État Belge*, EU:C:2009:471, para. 27 et seq., Case Law IBFD.

65. *Orange European Smallcap Fund NV* (C-194/06), para. 42.

66. HU: ECJ, 15 Apr. 2010, Case C-96/08, *CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central and Eastern Europe Szolgáltató, Tanácsadó és Kereskedelmi Kft. v. Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal Hatósági Fóosztály*, EU:C:2010:185, Case Law IBFD.

67. *Haribo and Salinen* (C-436/08 and C-437/08), para. 170.

68. BE: ECJ, 19 Sept. 2012, Case C-540/11, *Daniel Levy and Carine Sebbag*, EU:C:2012:581, para. 18 et seq.

69. *Baudinet and Others* (C-194/15), para. 30 et seq.

70. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 29.

71. *Seabrokers AS* (E-7/07), para 49 et seq.

72. Agreement on the European Economic Area, 2 May 1992, Primary Sources IBFD.

73. *Margarete Block* (C-67/08), para. 28; see also, for example, *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04), para. 20.

74. *Jacques Damseaux* (C-128/08), para. 27; see also, for example, *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04), paras. 19, 20 and 24 and *Orange European Smallcap Fund NV* (C-194/06), paras. 41, 42 and 47.

75. *Margarete Block* (C-67/08), para. 30; see also, for example, *Kerckhaert and Morres* (C-513/04), para. 22; and *Jacques Damseaux* (C-128/08), para. 33.

76. *Jacques Damseaux* (C-128/08), paras. 32-34.

77. Id., para. 30.

78. Id., para. 22. See, however, the still doubtful Opinion of Advocate General Kokott: BE: Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 15 Feb. 2007, Case C-464/05, *Maria Geurts and Dennis Vogten v. The Belgian State*, EU:C:2007:108, para. 60, Case Law IBFD. In footnote 37 she states that with regard to the case of dual unlimited inheritance tax liability it "remains to be seen" "[w]hether the Court of Justice, in accordance with the findings in *Kerckhaert and Morres*, would actually accept this consequence, even in the case of a very high burden of inheritance tax".

Member States concerned (but rather only impacts the exercise of that competence by one of them). This line of case law can, of course, be criticized in light of the ideal of the internal market in which neither double taxation nor double non-taxation would be acceptable.⁷⁹ First, the Court's reasoning in *Kerckhaert and Morres* seems to be at odds with extensive internal market case law on, for example, the prohibition of double contributory burdens in the field of social security⁸⁰ and of double taxation in the context of VAT.⁸¹ Second, a prohibition against double taxation under the freedoms would not excessively limit the Member States' tax sovereignty, as Member States would, in any event, be free to allocate taxing powers among them and to determine – by means, *inter alia*, of international agreements – the criteria for direct taxation “with a view to eliminating double taxation”.⁸² Third, the Court's hesitation to allocate responsibility for the avoidance of double taxation is not necessarily reflected in other areas of direct taxation where the Court has created or implicitly accepted “priority rules”.⁸³ Fourth and, finally, the Court's hesitation leads to an obvious asymmetry in the internal market: The Court protects Member States from taxpayers' double use of losses,⁸⁴ but does not equally protect taxpayers from Member States' double taxation of their profits – even though in a true internal market neither would be acceptable. The same is true for EU tax policy: the Amending Directive to the 2016 Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (2017/952) (ATAD 2),⁸⁵ for example, addresses double non-taxation in hybrid situations but does not

79. See also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on “Taxation in the European Union – Report on the development of tax systems”, OJ C 296/37 (1997), Appendix II: “Double taxation or the absence of taxation is incompatible with the internal market”.

80. See, for example, BE: ECJ, 15 Feb. 1996, Case C-53/95, *Inasti (Institut National d'Assurances Sociales pour Travailleurs Indépendants) v. Hans Kemmler*, EU:C:1996:58; BE: ECJ, 28 Mar. 1996, Case C-272/94, *Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA, as employer liable at civil law*, EU:C:1996:147; BE: ECJ, 23 Nov. 1999, Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, *Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96)*, EU:C:1999:575; DE: ECJ, 15 June 2000, Case C-302/98, *Manfred Sehrer v. Bundesknappschaft*, EU:C:2000:322, Case Law IBFD; FI: ECJ, 18 July 2006, Case C-50/05, *Maija T. I. Nikula*, EU:C:2006:493. The distinguishing line between taxation and social security implied in *CIBA* (96/08) seems to be based on whether there is a “direct benefit” for citizens. This is, however, quite unsatisfactory, as it leaves Member States a nearly unlimited leeway to escape scrutiny.

81. See, for example, NL: ECJ, 5 May 1982, Case 15/81, *Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal*, EU:C:1982:135, Case Law IBFD; DE: ECJ, 25 Feb. 1988, Case 299/86, *Criminal proceedings against Rainer Drexel*, EU:C:1988:103, para. 9 et seq., Case Law IBFD; and NL: ECJ, 21 May 1985, Case 47/84, *Gaston Schul (“Schul II”)*, EU:C:1985:216, para. 12 et seq., Case Law IBFD.

82. *Gilly* (C-336/96), para. 24; DE: ECJ, 28 Feb. 2008, Case C-293/06, *Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Großunternehmen in Hamburg*, para. 41, Case Law IBFD.

83. For example, DE: ECJ, 14 Feb. 1995, Case C-279/93, *Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker*, EU:C:1995:31, Case Law IBFD (concerning personal and family benefits) and UK: ECJ, 13 Dec. 2005, Case C-446/03, *Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes)*, EU:C:2005:763, Case Law IBFD (concerning foreign losses).

84. For example, *Marks & Spencer* (C-446/03), para. 47; NL: ECJ, 29 Mar. 2007, Case 120/78, *Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. Finanzamt Köln-Mitte*, EU:C:2007:194, para. 47, Case Law IBFD; and DE: ECJ, 15 May 2008, Case C-414/06, *Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Heilbronn*, EU:C:2008:278, para. 35, Case Law IBFD.

85. See Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, Primary Sources IBFD [hereinafter ATAD 2].

likewise address instances of double taxation. An effective prohibition of juridical double taxation would, however, require the Court to establish criteria for the identification of the state “responsible” for the existence of double taxation, a task the Court is clearly refraining from taking up.

It is nevertheless common ground that the abolition of double taxation is, still (even after the repeal of article 293(2) EC),⁸⁶ an objective of the TFEU, as the overlap of taxing jurisdictions may result in distortions of the internal market.⁸⁷ While no comprehensive substantive EU legislation is in sight, the Commission has nevertheless addressed the issue, *inter alia*, in its communications on double taxation in the Single Market (2011)⁸⁸ and on removing cross-border tax obstacles for EU citizens (2011),⁸⁹ as well as in a recommendation regarding relief for double taxation of inheritances (2011).⁹⁰

5.3. Scrutiny of a Member State's exercise of taxing jurisdiction

Société Générale is an important decision, as it clearly confirms the Court's view that, while Member States are free to determine the connecting factors for the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction in tax treaties, in exercising “the power of taxation, so allocated by bilateral conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, the Member States must comply with EU rules and, more particularly, observe the principle of equal treatment”.⁹¹ It can indeed be gleaned from the ECJ and EFTA Court case law that once a Member State has concluded a tax treaty, both the exemption and the credit method must be applied consistently with EU law.

This implies that, first, and even though the existing case law of the Court does not prohibit juridical double taxation, once a Member State has decided to provide relief from juridical double taxation, it must do so in a way that family and personal benefits of *individual taxpayers* are fully taken into account and not (implicitly) allocated to foreign income so as to limit the exemption or credit (see,

86. Treaty Establishing the European Community, 25 Mar. 1957, Primary Sources IBFD. See AT: ECJ, 12 Sept. 2017, Case C-648/15, *Austria v. Germany*, EU:C:2017:664, para. 26, Case Law IBFD, noting “the beneficial effect of the mitigation of double taxation on the functioning of the internal market that the European Union seeks to establish in accordance with Article 3(3) TEU and Article 26 TFEU”. In the past, the ECJ specifically referred to – now repealed – art. 293(2) EC Treaty to establish that “the abolition of double taxation is one of the objectives of the Community to be attained by the Member States” (see, for example, *Gilly* (C-336/96), para. 16 and SE: ECJ, 19 Jan. 2006, Case C-265/04, *Margaretha Bouanich v. Skatteverket*, EU:C:2006:51, para. 49, Case Law IBFD).

87. Discussion paper for the Informal Meeting of Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) Ministers, Taxation in the European Union, SEC(96)487 final, p. 7 (20 Mar. 1996).

88. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on Double Taxation in the Single Market, COM(2011) 712 final (11 Nov. 2011).

89. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on Tackling cross-border inheritance tax obstacles within the EU, COM(2011) 864 final (15 Dec. 2011).

90. Commission Recommendation of 15 December 2011 regarding relief for double taxation of inheritances, OJ L 336/81 (2011).

91. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 30, referring to *Sauvage and Lejeune* (C-602/17), para. 24 and *Jean Jacob and Dominique Lennertz* (C-174/18), para. 25.

for example, *De Groot*,⁹² *Beker and Beker*,⁹³ *Imfeld and Garcret* (Case C-303/12),⁹⁴ *Jacob and Lennertz*⁹⁵ and *BJ* (Case C-241/20)).⁹⁶ More generally, and beyond the subjective sphere of individual income taxation, in *Société Générale*, the Court implied that the discriminatory disallowance of deductions relating to foreign-sourced income would clearly be problematic, but also noted that “subject to verification by the referring court, in the main proceedings, the deduction of costs is not limited in the case of dividends distributed by another Member State”.⁹⁷ Given this background, however, this remark by the Court needs more context. *Société Générale* SA did not complain about the expense deduction as such, but rather that too much of the deductible expenses had been allocated to the foreign income (thereby reducing the “maximum deduction”), not too little. This question of expense allocation needs to be addressed next, as there are indeed EU/EEA law limitations with regard to the allocation of expenses to foreign-source income (*Seabrokers* (Case E-7/07)).⁹⁸

Second, the issue of allocation of expenses to foreign-sourced income, as addressed by the EFTA Court in *Seabrokers*,⁹⁹ requires some exploration. This is a particularly interesting question also from an EU law perspective, as tax treaties generally do not address the question of how costs or deductions should be allocated (apportioned) to foreign income¹⁰⁰ and largely leave this issue to be decided under domestic law. In a credit system, this allocation of (deductible) expenses between domestic and foreign activities is important not so much in determining taxable (overall) income but rather for the purpose of determining net income in the source state and hence the maximum deduction. The lower the net income in the source state from the residence state’s perspective (i.e. net foreign-sourced income determined under the residence state’s rules), the lower the maximum deduction. While the OECD is largely silent on this question,¹⁰¹ the fundamental freedoms of EU/EEA law limit a Member State’s options on how to allocate deductions in determining the maximum credit. In interpreting the freedom of estab-

lishment under the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Court in *Seabrokers*¹⁰² scrutinized rules that allocated, among others, interest expenses in proportion to domestic and foreign income, irrespective of the purpose for which an expense was incurred.

The Court distinguished three situations:

- (i) First, if expenses were “linked” to the foreign income, then they could be used to reduce the foreign income for the purposes of the limitation on credit, irrespective of whether the source state had granted a deduction under its domestic law.¹⁰³
- (ii) Second, if the “expenses cannot be linked to any particular business activities”, then the attribution of the expenses in proportion to the parts of the global net income earned in the home state and in the host state is adequate.¹⁰⁴
- (iii) However, third, there is a restriction on the freedom of establishment if “debt interest expenses related solely to a taxpayer’s business in the home State” are attributed “to the income of a branch situated in another EEA State when calculating the maximum credit allowance”.¹⁰⁵ Such allocation places taxpayers with a branch in another EEA state in a less favourable position for the sole reason that they made use of their right of establishment under the EEA Agreement. This discriminatory restriction results from the fact that taxpayers having all their debt interest expenses linked to the home state are in a comparable position with regard to those expenses whether or not they also conduct their business through a branch in another EEA state, and therefore “should get the same tax treatment in the home State with respect to these expenses”.¹⁰⁶

The Court, in *Société Générale*, did not address *Seabrokers* directly. It did, however, refer to the issue of expense deduction when it noted that “the same rules for allocating costs which derive from the French General Tax Code would apply to that income, regardless of its origin”.¹⁰⁷ While that reference indicates that the allocation of costs under domestic law is not *prima facie* discriminatory, *Seabrokers* would require even more. A Member State would not, for example, be allowed to apportion parts of the costs that are only directly connected to a domestic activity also to foreign-sourced income (and thereby reduce the maximum credit). It is unclear if such allocation issues have arisen in *Société Générale* and if, under the French rules, charges unrelated to the foreign-sourced dividends were allocated to them. It is known that, for purposes of the “maximum deduction”, the foreign dividends were reduced by “the justified charges relating to those dividends”, i.e. the expenses that “are incurred solely as a result of the acquisition, holding or disposal

92. *De Groot* (C-385/00).
93. *Manfred Beker and Christa Beker* (C-168/11); *see also* the subsequent domestic decision in this case, I R 71/10 (18 Dec. 2013).
94. BE: ECJ, 12 Dec. 2013, Case C-303/12, *Guido Imfeld, Nathalie Garcret v. État belge*, EU:C:2013:822, Case Law IBFD.
95. *Jean Jacob and Dominique Lennertz* (C-174/18).
96. LU: ECJ, 15 July 2021, Case C-241/20, *BJ v. État belge*, EU:C:2021:605.
97. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 42.
98. *Seabrokers* AS (E-7/07).
99. *Id.*
100. Paras. 39-41, 44 and 62 *OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23* (2017).
101. As regards deductions relating to the income itself (for example, depreciation and amortization, business expenses, etc.), the wording of arts. 23A and 22B *OECD Model* (2017) seems to leave quite a bit of leeway and also the Commentary refers to an allocation that is “specified or proportional” (para. 63 *OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23* (2017)). While a direct allocation of income-related expenses seems to be a common (and reasonable) approach (*see, for example*, DE: BFH, 16 Mar. 1994, I R 42/93, BStBl 1994 II 799; *see also* DE: BFH, 6 Apr. 2016, I R 61/14, BStBl 2017 II 48, focusing on the question of which activity primarily caused the respective expenses), art. 23B would perhaps even allow for a proportionate allocation of deductions that are clearly related only to domestic income (*see, in this direction*, UK: High Court of Justice (Chancery Division), 14 July 2006, *Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs*, [2006] EWHC 1770 (Ch), paras. 31-32).

102. *Seabrokers* AS (E-7/07).

103. *Id.*, para. 54.

104. *Id.*, para. 55.

105. *Id.*, para. 57; *see also* I R 61/14 (6 Apr. 2016).

106. *Seabrokers* AS (E-7/07), para. 56.

107. *Société Générale* (C-403/19), para. 32.

of the securities which produce the dividends, which are directly related to the receipt of the dividends and which do not result in an increase in assets".¹⁰⁸ Obviously considering that all expenses at issue were directly ("specifically")¹⁰⁹ linked to the foreign-source dividends, *Société Générale* did not create a direct conflict with the EFTA Court's decision in *Seabrokers*. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that disadvantages may arise because of different perspectives as to which costs relate directly to the foreign-sourced dividends. Such an outcome, however, was implicitly accepted by the EFTA Court in *Seabrokers*, wherein it noted that "to the extent the host State does not grant a deduction for expenses relating solely to the income of the branch when calculating the tax on the income of the branch, the resulting burden for the taxpayer is simply a consequence of the two States exercising their different tax regimes in parallel and does not constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA".¹¹⁰

5.4. What about the source Member State?

Finally, it should be noted that the credit limitation in *Société Générale* was due to the fact that the source states (Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) had all levied a tax on gross income (i.e. the gross amount of the dividends), while the residence state (France) had determined that income on a net basis after deduction of directly linked expenses and taxed it at the regular corporate tax rate. The "excess" tax was therefore also caused by the gross-basis taxation in the source states, as the lower treaty rate (15% in the France-Italy Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1989),¹¹¹ the France-Netherlands Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1973),¹¹² as well as in the France-United Kingdom Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1968)¹¹³ did not make up for the higher (gross) base. EU law, however, certainly has an impact on that question as well. A number of cases – ranging from *Gerritse* (Case C-234/01)¹¹⁴ and *Scorpio* (Case C-290/04)¹¹⁵ to *Miljoen* (Case C-10/14),¹¹⁶

108. *Id.*, para. 19.
109. See, for that terminology, *id.*, para. 34.
110. *Seabrokers AS* (E-7/07), para. 54.
111. *Convention between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Italian Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital and for the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and Fraud (with a Protocol and Exchange of Letters)* (unofficial translation) (5 Oct. 1989), Treaties & Models IBFD [hereinafter *Fr.-Italy Income and Capital Tax Treaty* (1989)].
112. *Convention between the Republic of France and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital* (unofficial translation) (16 Mar. 1973) (as amended through 2004), Treaties & Models IBFD.
113. *Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income* (22 May 1968) (as amended through 1987), Treaties & Models IBFD.
114. DE: ECJ, 12 June 2003, Case C-234/01, *Arnoud Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukolln-Nord*, EU:C:2003:340, paras. 25-29, Case Law IBFD (concerning business expenses of artists that are directly linked to the activity that generated the taxable income in the source state).
115. DE: ECJ, 3 Oct. 2006, Case C-290/04, *FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Eimsbüttel*, EU:C:2006:630, paras. 41-49, Case Law IBFD (concerning business expenses of a service provider that are economically connected with his activities in the Member State in which the services are provided).
116. *Miljoen and Others* (C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14), paras. 55-61 (concerning expenses directly related to dividends); see also CFE, *supra* n. 13.

Brisal (Case C-18/15)¹¹⁷ and *Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek* (Case C-252/14)¹¹⁸ – have shown that non-residents are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment with regard to the deduction of business expenses directly related to the income-generating activity in the source state. While this basic foundation is solid, there are still some open questions, for example, whether the comparison should include a combined perspective on tax base and tax rate,¹¹⁹ whether such deduction must already be possible at the moment of withholding¹²⁰ or if a refund procedure is sufficient,¹²¹ and which concrete expenses are "directly related" to a certain activity.¹²² More specifically, *Société Générale* has already brought that issue before the Court, albeit not entirely successfully: in its decision in *Miljoen and Others*, which also included *Société Générale* as a litigant, the Court held that neither the part of the purchase price of shares that represents an upcoming dividend (which can be deducted when calculating the tax base, effectively eliminating tax on the dividend), nor financing costs, both of which concern ownership of shares as such, are "directly linked" in that way to the actual dividends from those shares.¹²³

6. The Statement

The Court's decision in *Société Générale* reinforces established case law that EU law neither prohibits juridical double taxation nor does it impose an obligation on the residence Member State to prevent the disadvantages that could arise from the exercise of competence thus attributed by the two Member States. The parallel existence of taxing jurisdiction, however, must be distinguished from the exercise of such jurisdiction by each Member State. While Member States are free to determine the connecting factors for the allocation of taxing jurisdiction in tax treaties, in exercising the "power of taxation, so allocated by bilateral conventions for the avoid-

117. IE: ECJ, 13 July 2016, Case C-18/15, *Brisal – Auto Estradas do Litoral S.A., KBC Finance Ireland v. Fazenda Pública*, EU:C:2016:549, paras. 23-54, Case Law IBFD (concerning expenses directly related to interest); see also CFE ECJ Task Force, *Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2016 on the Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 July 2016 in Brisal and KBC Finance Ireland (Case C-18/15), on the Admissibility of Gross Withholding Tax of Interest*, 57 Eur. Taxn. 1 (2017), Journal Articles & Opinion Pieces IBFD.
118. SE: ECJ, 2 June 2016, Case C-252/14, *Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek v. Skatteverket*, ECLI:EU:C:2016:402, paras. 64-65, Case Law IBFD (concerning expenses directly related to dividends).
119. Compare, for example, on the one hand, SE: ECJ, 19 Nov. 2015, Case C-632/13, *Hilkka Hirvonen*, EU:C:2015:765, para. 44 and *Miljoen and Others* (C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14), para. 61 (both accepting that, in a specific case, a difference in rate can compensate for a difference in base) with, for example, on the other hand, *Gerritse* (C-234/01) (clearly distinguishing between base discrimination and rate advantage), and *Brisal* (C-18/15), paras. 31-33 (holding categorically that a base discrimination "cannot be justified by the fact that non-resident financial institutions are subject to a tax rate which is lower than the rate for resident financial institutions").
120. See *FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH* (C-290/04), paras. 41-49.
121. See *Brisal* (C-18/15), para. 42.
122. See, for example, the different approaches to financing costs with regard to dividend-generating shares, on the one hand, and interest-generating loans, on the other, in *Miljoen and Others* (C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14), para. 60 and *Brisal* (C-18/15), para. 48, and the discussion in CFE ECJ Task Force, *supra* n. 117.
123. *Miljoen and Others* (C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14), para. 60. For analysis see, for example, CFE, *supra* n. 13, at p. 259.

ance of double taxation, the Member States must comply with EU rules and, more particularly, observe the principle of equal treatment".

It is generally accepted in the Court's case law that both the ordinary credit and exemption (including exemption with progression) methods are permissible to avoid double taxation. In *Société Générale*, this position was confirmed, specifically as regards the "maximum deduction" under the ordinary credit method in tax treaties, even though this treatment can result in a disadvantage for cross-border income as compared with domestic income. As the disadvantage in *Société Générale* was due to the difference between gross-basis taxation of dividends in the source Member States (Italy, the Netherlands and the

United Kingdom) and net-basis taxation of those foreign-sourced dividends in the residence state (France), it remains to be seen whether or not future cases will bring clarity in light of the *Seabrokers* decision of the EFTA Court, which examined how expenses can be lawfully allocated to foreign income from the perspective of the residence Member State.

CFE Tax Advisers Europe stresses that, in an internal market, neither (unintended) double non-taxation nor double taxation is acceptable. It, therefore, calls on all EU institutions to analyse and address the remaining issues of juridical double taxation – including in the context of the upcoming actions to amend the current corporate tax directives.